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Abstract 
This essay analyses the relationship between corporate governance practices and Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) wages from a sample of Portuguese listed companies over the 
period from 2002-2011. The relationship between CEO total compensation and 
shareholders return, firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, board of directors and 
shareholders characteristics is analysed. It is found that firm specific factors accounts for 
the majority of the variance in total CEO pay, while firm performance accounts for less 
than 5%. It is also found that the CEO characteristics, board of directors’ structures, and 
shareholders features are related with the CEO pay. The policy implications of these 
results are then derived. 
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1. Introduction 
Public listed firms are characterized by the separation of ownership (the principal - 
shareholders) and control (the agent - management). Unless effective corporate systems 
of governance are in place, agency-costs caused by the different principal-agent interests 
are incurred and firm value reduced (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983). A particular manifestation of agency costs is excessive Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO) compensation. Governance practices endeavour to align the principal’s 
(shareholders’) interests with the agent’s interests to maximise the shareholders’ value. 
The natural hypothesis is therefore that a firm with more efficient governance practices 
in place should observe CEO compensation more aligned with firm performance. In other 
words, firms that follow corporate governance best practices should observe less excess 
CEO earnings. The question is which corporate governance devices are more efficient? 
The present study analyses the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and CEO earnings in Portuguese companies from 2002-2011, by means of several panel 
data estimation models, including a dynamic micro panel data model (Arellano-Bond, 
1991). Several sets of factors are analysed: firm performance, firm specific 
characteristics, CEO specific characteristics, board of directors and ownership structure. 
The results reveal that total return to shareholders is positively associated with total CEO 
pay; however this variable explains only a small fraction of total CEO earnings. Firm 
specific characteristics are found to explain a larger amount of the CEO earnings 
variability. Particularly, it is found that firm size and dividend yields are positively 
associated with higher CEO earnings. Moreover, the CEO earnings are lower in family 
and regulated firms. With respect to CEO specific characteristics it is found that CEO age 
and the fraction of the CEO earnings that are variable drive the executives’ earnings up. 
The results also show that CEO education and stock based compensation might reduce 
CEO total earnings. With respect to the board of directors’ characteristics it is found that 
the existence of a remuneration committee does not restrict the CEO’s to extract over paid 
earnings. On the other hand, the results support the view that a large fraction of 
independent directors might lower CEO excess earnings. Finally, with respect to the 
shareholders characteristics, the results found support the view that anti-takeover devices 
such as shareholders agreements and voting caps might enable CEOs to extract extra 
rents. On the other hand, the level of participation in the shareholders general meetings 
and the free float are found to be negatively associated with the CEO earnings. 
The present research contributes to the corporate governance literature in several 
ways. First, it adds new insights as to whether a more independent board of directors’ can 
in fact limit the ability of CEO’s to earn excess earnings. Although this hypothesis has 
been tested empirically no consensus has yet been achieved. For instance, Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009) provide evidence that a more independent board of directors is 
negatively associated with CEO compensation but Guthrie et al. (2012), using the same 
data sample and excluding just two outliers (from a total of 865 firms), show that there is 
no effect between the level of board independence and the level of CEO pay. Secondly, 
different corporate governance devices can have complementary or substitutive effects 
(Farinha, 2003). In that sense, analysing the effect of a single set of corporate governance 
devices on the level of CEO pay may provide biased results and misinterpretations. To 
address that potential problem, in addition to firm specific variables, this paper includes 
a larger than usual set of corporate governance variables, including ownership variables, 
shareholders meetings data and CEO individual characteristics. Finally, the majority of 
the empirical research on CEO compensation builds on either US or UK data, where 
financial markets are more efficient and corporate governance practices are potentially 
more developed when compared with small European countries such as Portugal. A 
number of issues that are specific to Portugal might make unrealistic the generalization 
of those countries results. For instance, there are only two codes of governance in 
Portugal, one established by the National Securities and Markets Authority (CMVM) and 
other by Portuguese Corporate Governance Institute. This is uncommon when compared 
with the observed codes of governance worldwide; such codes are generally drawn up by 
governments, directors’ associations, managers’ associations, professional bodies and 
investors, and the codes are usually overseen by autonomous watch-dogs (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Furthermore, not all of the listed companies completely respect 
Portugal’s code. Finally, there are two types of board systems: the single-tier system that 
is common in Latin countries and the two-tier system that is common in countries based 
on the common law tradition, such as the UK (Rose, 2006). The concentration of power 
in a single-tier system, such as in Portugal, might restrict the impetus to adopt governance 
principles that are considered to be efficient in other countries. Moreover, the European 
Commission stresses the importance of having a non-executive chairman on the board of 
directors (Berglof, 1997) which is not observed in the majority of the Portuguese public 
firms. Taking into account this framework, one can assert that Portugal lacks the 
necessary governance codes of practice. Further, the high concentration of power make 
these firms perfect places for CEOs to receive excessive payment relative to his or her 
performance (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Ikaheimo, et al., 2011). These facts make it 
interesting to analyse pay and performance in this market. 
The paper is organised as follows. In the second section, the contextual setting is 
presented. In the third and fourth sections, the literature survey and the theoretical 
framework are presented. The fifth section presents the hypotheses. The sixth section 
presents the data and the methodology. The seventh section discusses the results. Finally, 
the eighth section concludes the paper. 
 2. Contextual setting 
Governance practices are based on codes. A governance code is a set of standards that 
governs the role and the composition of the board of directors, the relationships within 
the board, the auditing and information disclosure and the selection and dismissal of 
directors and senior managers (Khurshed, et al. 2011; Ammann, et al. 2011; Ozkan, 2007, 
2011; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Richard, et al. 2009; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2004). Pay-performance contracts are negotiated with the purpose of aligning the 
principal-agent relationship, but when based on standard accounting measures, they can 
be manipulated to boost the executive’s earnings. Monitoring the firm management is 
therefore crucial to aligning interests. The efficiency of the board monitoring role depends 
on a number of factors identified by previous research (Conyon, 1997; Benito and 
Conyon, 1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Sawicki, 2009; and Ozkan, 2011), the most 
significant of which is the independence of the external directors from the CEO and the 
internal board members. If the CEO influences the director’s election process, the 
independence of the board is compromised and CEO monitoring is rendered ineffective. 
The result is CEO entrenchment and the opportunity for him to demand earnings in excess 
of the market equilibrium wage.  
The Portuguese corporate governance code evolved from an initial set of non-binding 
recommendations that were issued by the Portuguese securities and markets authority 
(CMVM). The first draft of this code was written in October 1999, and it suggested that 
listed firms should disclose information about 15 governance recommendations, such as 
shareholders’ voting rights and proxy, conflicts of interest, the board of directors’ 
structure, and director’s functional roles. In relation to the board of directors, the code 
explicitly encouraged the inclusion of independent members in the managerial bodies. 
During 2001, the code was revised to include the “comply or explain” principle, allowing 
firms to choose not to follow the code’s prescriptions, as long as they disclosed the 
reasons for their non-compliance. In this revision, some of the recommendations were 
upgraded to bidding rules, and the governance report format became mandatory. Two 
recommendations related to the board members’ remuneration were added. The first 
recommendation stressed the need for a portion of the manager’s total earnings to be 
linked to the company’s income and the second recommendation was that any stock 
option plan should be discussed and approved by the shareholders at the annual general 
meeting. In 2003, the code was revised again, and the recommendations related to board 
remuneration were restated, insisting that manager earnings “should be aligned with the 
company interests” and that the annual amount received by the board and key executives 
should be disclosed on an individual basis. The 2005 code revision added one 
recommendation, suggesting that boards should have a sufficient number of non-
executive board members, and another suggestion restating that shareholders should 
approve the board remuneration policy. In 2007, the corporate governance code was 
completely redrafted, with the total number of recommendations increasing from 15 to 
43 and many more detailed recommendations having been added. During 2009, a single 
piece of legislature forced all of the listed firms to disclose the annual amounts received 
by the board and the key executives on an individual basis. Lastly, in 2010, the corporate 
governance code was once again redrafted and some disclosure recommendations were 
changed into mandatory rules.  
The present study builds on published data by Portuguese listed firms on their 
corporate governance annual reports. Particularly, CEO, board of directors and ownership 
features are analysed. 
 
a. Literature survey 
There are several strands in the governance literature. One major line of research 
focuses on the macroeconomic impact of governance by country (La Porta et al., 1997, 
1998, 2000; Durnev and Kim, 2005) and concludes that corporate governance systems 
are linked to the legal traditions of the country. Countries with a civil law tradition, as 
opposed to a common law tradition (dominant in Anglo-Saxon countries), are the least 
effective at protecting shareholders rights (La Porta et al., 1998). Another line of research, 
more relevant to the present study, adopts a microeconomic approach and focuses on 
analysing pay, performance and board composition. Research on this issue by Pennathur 
and Shellor (2002) measured the determinants of CEO earnings as a function of the firm’s 
performance, where performance is measured by the stock returns, investments and funds 
from operations. Further analyses of the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
earnings are provided by Gregg et al. (2005), Conyon and Murphy (2000), Ozkan (2007, 
2011), Shin and Seo (2011), among others. The overall results show that firm 
performance does not have a significant impact on CEO compensation and where it does 
it explains only a small fraction of total CEOs earnings.  
Core et al. (1999) analysed the relationship between the CEO’s earnings and the 
board’s composition, concluding that the board’s composition explains a significant 
amount of cross-sectional variation in the CEO’s earnings after controlling for the 
standard economic determinants of pay. Their result reveals that the CEO has greater 
earnings when the governance structures are less efficient. Gosh and Sirmans (2005) 
concluded that the CEO’s earnings depend significantly on the usual economic measures 
of performance, including firm size and return on assets, as well as on the board’s 
composition. They find that the CEO’s earnings are higher in firms with weak monitoring 
due to either large size or elderly directors. They also find that the existence of a block 
holder has an adverse impact on the CEO’s earnings. More recently, Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2009) provide evidence that US listed firms with better governance present 
less excess CEO compensation but Guthrie et al. (2012) fail to confirm this result.  
A related stream of literature analyses the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance. In that scope, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) analysed the role of 
external directors on the governance of the firm and concluded that a greater 
representation of external directors enhances the firm’s performance. Yermack (1996) 
demonstrated that bigger boards are detrimental to performance. Although Bhagat and 
Black (1999) failed to confirm these results, further corroboration did come from Brickley 
et al. (1997), who found that external directors enhance shareholder gains in tender offers. 
However, Agarwal and Knoeber (1996) and Mishra and Nielsen (2000) failed to confirm 
the positive effects of external directors. Carretta et al. (2011) studied the effect of news 
releases regarding the board of directors functioning and composition on stock returns in 
Italy. 
A recent survey on the effectiveness of the different corporate governance devices 
can be found in Edmans and Xavier (2009) and William (2010). The current investigation 
takes a step forward and analyses Portuguese CEOs earnings and board composition 
variables, including a quantitative analysis of the individual characteristics of Portuguese 
listed companies. Compared with Fernandes (2008) study on Portuguese CEO’s 
compensation, this paper adopts a larger data span, uses more variables to complement 
the previous research in this market and adopts innovative panel data models. 
Additionally, instead of looking at the executive management earnings as whole, this 
paper focuses specifically on the CEO earnings. This approach is more interesting when 
one addressing the board of directors’ entrenchment hypothesis. 
 
b. Theoretical framework 
Williamson (2002) presented a theoretical framework to analyse governance issues at 
the firm level. Hermalin and Weisback (1998) provided a theoretical framework that 
related pay and performance to the board composition, and Fama and Jensen (1983) 
presented a related theoretical framework. These 3 models are the theoretical basis for the 
current research. In the Hermalin and Weisback (1998) model, board effectiveness is a 
function of board independence. Four elements are essential in explaining this 
relationship: first, management turnover is more closely linked to earnings than to stock 
returns; second, a board tends to become less independent over the course of a CEO’s 
career; third, independent directors are added to the board following poor corporate 
performance; and fourth, CEO turnover is negatively related to performance and this 
relationship is stronger when the board is more independent.  
In theory, the CEO’s salary is fixed by the corporate board depending on supply and 
demand. The wage may be fixed at the optimal level if the observed board structures are 
conducive to CEO monitoring. If the proper board structures are in place, the pay-
performance contracts are optimal and reflect the economic determinants of performance. 
However, if the director election process is influenced by the CEO, the independence of 
the board is compromised and CEO monitoring is rendered ineffective, which results in 
CEO entrenchment and the opportunity for the CEO to demand earnings in excess of the 
equilibrium wage rate. Under this scenario, the board structure variables reflect the 
effectiveness of the firm’s governance structure and impact CEO earnings. The wage will 
be non-optimal in view of the performance observed. 
 
 
 
c. Hypotheses 
Four sets of factors that explain the CEO’s earnings have been suggested in the 
literature: (1) company performance (e.g., Coughlan et al., 1985; Jensen and Murphy, 
1990); (2) firm specific characteristics (e.g., Jensen and Ruback, 1983, Core et al., 1999, 
and Gosh and Sirmans, 2005); (3) CEO specific characteristics (e.g. Core et al., 1999; 
Ozkan, 2011); (4) board of directors structure and composition (e.g. Conyon et al. 1995; 
Conyon et al. 1997); and (5) shareholders and ownership characteristics (e.g. Shin and 
Seo, 2011). The hypotheses proposed in this research are derived from the 
abovementioned theoretical models, and from the explanatory indicators found in the 
empirical literature. 
i. Performance hypothesis 
Return to shareholders 
Under the agency theory hypothesis, CEO compensation packages are designed to 
provide incentives for the CEO to increase the shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Murphy, 
1990). If payments are designed this way, it should be observed a positive relationship 
between the CEO’s compensation and the firm’s performance. To test this relationship, 
this paper follows Core et al. (1999) and uses the total return to shareholders (TRS) as 
proxy for firm performance. TRS is defined as the market stock price annual return 
including any dividends paid out to shareholders. 
H1: CEO earnings are a positive function of total return to shareholders (TRS). 
 
ii. Firm specific characteristics 
Firm size 
There is a large body of evidence that connects the firm size to compensation: Jensen 
and Murphy (1990), Core et al. (1999), Renders, et al. (2010), and Gregorič et al. (2010), 
just to name a few. The theoretical justification for this connection is that managers of 
larger and more complex firms must be rewarded for the greater dimension/complexity 
of their work. For instance, Core et al. (1999) argue that larger firms with greater growth 
opportunities and more complex operations will demand higher-quality managers and 
will provide higher equilibrium wages; therefore, it should be observed larger payments 
to these managers. Smith and Watts (1992) find evidence that firms that have greater 
investment opportunities employ executives who are more highly skilled and who must 
be given a higher level of pay. It is therefore expected to see a positive relationship 
between the CEO’s pay and higher levels of the firm’s complexity.  
Employees 
Another firm specific characteristic that might influence the level of CEO pay is the 
level of the firm dependability on human capital. Under the stakeholders theory (Freeman, 
1984), after controlling for firm size, firms whose performance largely depends on skilled 
and motivated employees shall have more ethical concerns under the penalty of creating 
internal conflicts and thus harming the performance of the company. Within this line of 
though, it is expect to see a negative relationship between the total number of employees 
and CEO’s excess compensation. 
 
Financing and pay-out policy 
Another two specific firm features have been suggested in the literature to have an 
impact on CEO total earnings: the use of debt financing and the level of dividends paid 
out to shareholders. Jensen (1986) has provided the theoretical framework for the 
relationship between agency costs and debt. In his framework, debt is beneficial in that it 
reduces the agency costs of free cash flows. A conflict of interest between the 
shareholders and the managers will arise when the firm generates substantial free cash 
flow; the use of debt requires managers to pay out future cash flows, thereby reducing the 
cash flow available for discretionary spending by the managers. This mechanism reduces 
the CEO’s ability to extract extra rents, and a negative relationship between the use of 
debt financing and the CEO’s earnings is expected. This hypothesis has been tested in the 
literature by Ryan and Wiggens (2001), Florackis and Ozkan (2009), and Shin and Seo 
(2011) and their results are consistent with the proposal that debt minimises agency costs. 
In a similar view, firms that pay out more dividends have potentially less free cash-flow 
available and therefore dividends may help to reduce agency problems (Farinha, 2003; 
Sawicki, 2009). Moreover, with less internal generated funds available those firms must 
raise external capital more frequently and by that means provide updated information to 
the market, reducing information asymmetries and therefore agency costs (Easterbrook, 
1984). 
 
Family 
Literature on family owned companies (e.g. Schulze et al., 2001; Dyer, 2006; Herrero, 
2011) argue that agency problems in family businesses are of different scope than of those 
found in widely held public firms. Anderson and Reeb (2003) provide evidence that 
family ownership is an effective organizational structure. Particularly, these authors find 
that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms and when family members serve as 
CEO, performance is better than with outside CEOs. This piece of evidence suggests that 
family owned firms face less agency costs and the ability for CEOs to extract extra rents 
from the firm is less likely.  In that sense we expect to see lower levels of excess CEO 
earnings in family owned firms. 
 
Regulated 
The last firm characteristic analysed in the present study is whether the firm is a 
regulated firm or not. Banks and utilities have the particularity of being subject to 
predetermined rules in terms of business conduction which are imposed by regulators. 
Further, beyond the normal monitoring devices in place for non-regulated firms, 
regulators provide additional monitoring and disciplining of the management (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985). Given this argument we expect to see lower levels of CEO pay in 
regulated firms. 
In sum, it is conjectured that a set of firm specific characteristics influence the level 
of CEO’s total earnings, specifically: firm size; firm dependability on employees; use of 
debt financing; dividend pay-out policy; whether the firm is family owned; and whether 
it is a regulated firm. The hypothesis to be tested is the following: 
H2: CEO earnings are a function of firm specific characteristics. 
 
iii. CEO specific characteristics 
CEO age and tenure 
Several CEO specific characteristics have been suggested in the literature to have 
impact on CEO compensation. Two of those characteristics are CEO age and tenure. The 
managerial entrenchment hypothesis is usually presented to explain that relationship. The 
rational is that CEO age and tenure increases his level of firm specific knowledge 
(experience) and therefore the greater the difficulty to replace him. In other words, any 
CEO characteristic that enhances his entrenchment within the firm may have influence 
on his excess level of compensation. For that reason, pay-performance contracts are 
usually seen more generous for older CEOs and with a longer tenure, suggesting that there 
is managerial entrenchment in the company (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Florackis and 
Ozkan, 2009; 2011). Within that line of though, Hill and Phan (1991) find that the 
relationship between the CEO’s pay and the stock returns weakens with tenure. In light 
of these results, it should be expected to find a positive relationship between the CEO’s 
age and tenure, and the CEO’s earnings. 
 
CEO education 
Another CEO specific characteristic that has recently received some attention from 
the corporate governance literature is the CEO education. Based on the human capital 
theory (Becker, 1962), executive officers with higher levels of education should 
correspond to managers with more abilities and consequently firms with better 
performance. Within that theoretical framework, Bhagat et al. (2010) find that CEOs with 
MBA degrees lead to short-term improvements in operating performance but fail to find 
a relationship between CEO education and long-term firm performance. Also, corporate 
governance codes around the world, including the Portuguese code often require (or 
recommend) firms to disclose their managers’ curriculum vitae. The idea is that the 
shareholders have the pertinent information concerning the skills and experience of the 
firm’s management. Nevertheless, in the Portuguese context it is not uncommon to see 
CEOs with no college degree (or any formal management education) and long tenure, 
suggesting that either education is not a determinant for Portuguese firm performance or 
that the shareholders appreciate other abilities beyond education. Within this line of 
reasoning, education can be used as an inverse proxy for CEO entrenchment. A less 
educated CEO should in theory provide ex-ante less guaranties of leading the firm 
successfully. But, if the manager remains in the company with a lower level of education 
than their peers, it may mean he has specific knowledge about the business that make his 
replacement be very costly, (e.g. special ties with major clients or with the government). 
In other words, CEOs with low levels of education may indicate entrenched managers. If 
that is the case then one should find a negative relationship between CEO education levels 
and CEO excessive earnings. On the other hand, based on the human capital theory, more 
educated managers should provide better skills to the firm and therefore require higher 
levels of compensation. In sum, whether CEO education level is positively or negatively 
related with CEO compensation is an empirical question which will be tested in the 
present study. 
 
Compensation structure 
Beyond the CEO age, tenure and education the present study also investigates other 
two features related with the structure of the CEO compensation package: the fraction of 
the variable earnings in the total compensation package and whether or not that variable 
compensation is stock based. The Portuguese corporate governance code explicitly 
highlights the need for a part of the CEO total compensation to be variable and linked to 
the firm performance. In that view, CEOs with a larger fraction of variable compensation 
should have their total earnings more aligned with firm performance and thus less likely 
the ability for executives to extract extra rents from the firm. Moreover, if listed firms 
have compensation schemes that are not only based on cash payments but are also based 
on stock compensation, such as stock option grants and restricted stocks, CEOs should 
also observe less excessive pay. If this type of compensation structure (with variable and 
stock based earnings) serves as an incentive to align the executives’ interests with the 
shareholders’ interests, then after controlling for firm performance, it should be expected 
a negative relationship between the total cash compensation earned by the CEOs and the 
fraction of variable compensation. Furthermore, if the variable compensation is fully or 
partially stock based then those CEOs should also earn less excessive pay. Nevertheless, 
as shown by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), manipulated reported earnings through 
discretionary accrual accounting are more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s total 
potential compensation is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. 
Given the above discussion, it is conjectured that CEO age, tenure and education, and 
the structure of the total CEO earnings influence the level of CEO’s total earnings. The 
hypothesis to be tested is the following: 
H3: CEO earnings are a function of CEO specific characteristics. 
 
iv. Board of directors characteristics 
The way the board of directors is structured is a major determinant of agency costs 
(Hermalin and Weisback, 1998). Several features of the board of directors have been 
suggested in the governance literature to have impact on agency costs. The present study 
addresses the following board features: whether the chairman of the board is the same 
person as the CEO; the board size; the board activity (measured as the total number of 
meetings); the remuneration committee; the fiscal board and auditing committee; the size 
of other governance commissions; the level of board independence (from executive 
directors); board gender diversity; and the presence of foreign directors. 
 
CEO/Chairman duality 
The literature analysing board of directors’ structures has frequently suggested that 
when the CEO is also the chairman of the board (CEO/Chair duality) he has significant 
power over the board and therefore more likely to be entrenched and able to extract extra 
rents (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Shin and Seo, 2011). However, Florackis and Ozkan (2009) 
highlights that empirical studies on UK listed firms do not support that view. 
 
Board size 
With respect to the board size, the same authors reveal that there is no consensus in 
the literature of whether or not bigger boards are more efficient in monitoring 
management. On the one hand the decision making process in bigger boards are 
potentially less efficient and the monitoring role of the board compromised. Yermack 
(1996) provides empirical evidence supporting this argument. On the other hand it is more 
difficult for the CEO to negotiate generous compensation packages far beyond his ability 
to generate wealth for shareholders. Furthermore, having a large number of other directors 
in the board can mean more potential CEO substitutes which can then lead to less 
entrenchment in the firm. Given this discussion the board size can either be positively or 
negatively related with the CEO compensation.  
 
Board activity 
Another board of directors feature that can have impact on CEO compensation is the 
board activity, measured as the total number of board meeting held during the year. The 
theoretical rational behind this relationship is that boards that meet more frequently might 
also perform their monitoring functions more frequently. Literature on corporate 
governance and firm performance has documented however that board that meet more 
frequently is less efficient (Vafeas, 1999). Consistent with this result, Shin and Seo (2011) 
find a positive relationship between the total number of board meetings and the total CEO 
pay, suggesting that board activity is inversely related to its efficiency. 
The Portuguese directors’ remuneration can either be fixed directly by the 
shareholders within the general meeting or by a committee of shareholders elected at the 
general meeting1. The Portuguese corporate governance code recommends the 
remuneration committee to submit to the general shareholders meeting appreciation the 
directors’ remuneration policy. Implicitly, the corporate governance code recommends 
firms to elect a remuneration committee. In this study we also analyse the existence and 
dimension of the remuneration committee. If this committee is in fact an important 
                                                             
1 Article 399 and 429 of the Portuguese Commercial Company Act. 
corporate governance device one should see a negative relationship between the total 
number of remuneration committee members and excess CEO earnings. 
 
Fiscal board and auditing committee 
Under the current governance structures that are admissible by Portuguese law, 
companies can choose to have a fiscal body that is either a fiscal board (or a single person) 
or an auditing committee.  The auditing committee is part of the board of directors, while 
the fiscal body is a separate entity. The latter can be composed of a single fiscal person 
or could be a fiscal board; a fiscal board normally consists of at least 3 persons that are 
proposed by the board of directors and elected in the shareholders’ meeting. The fiscal 
board carries, among other duties, the responsibility for analysing the quality of the 
financial information provided by the executive board (Beasley, 1996) and guaranteeing 
that management is acting on behalf of the shareholders’ interests. It is assumed that a 
larger fiscal board can more efficiently monitor the management quality and the financial 
information provided by the board of directors to the shareholders. Additionally, a large 
fiscal board is less likely to become entrenched with the board of directors and is less 
likely to have a conflicts of interest arising from the fact that they are recruited by the 
board. 
One of the arguments in favour of a creating a permanent auditing body in the board 
of directors, instead of having a separate fiscal board, is that the members are more often 
present at board meetings and assess the executive director’s work more closely (Bronson 
et al., 2006, Piot and Janin, 2007, and Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). The fiscal board 
meets less frequently, and their monitoring role is more limited because they do not have 
access to the same level of information as the auditing committee members. At the same 
time, by including an auditing committee within the board of directors, the potential 
entrenchment could become more accentuated.  Nevertheless, similar to the fiscal board, 
a larger auditing committee should have fewer issues around entrenchment, and a 
negative relationship between the CEO’s pay and the total number of auditing committee 
members should be perceived. Piot and Janin (2007), in their own research in France have 
considered the effect of having an internal auditor and the relationship between the 
internal auditor or auditing committee and earnings management. They have also assessed 
the effects of different dimensions of auditing quality, such as the prestige of the 
accounting firm, the existence of an auditing committee and its dependence on 
management and how these dimensions change profits. They found that the presence of 
accountants from 5 famous auditing companies did not cause a reduction in earnings 
management. The existence of an auditing committee, however, did cause greater 
earnings management. They express that these results in corporate governance are related 
to French companies, which are different from U.S. companies. The fiscal board and 
auditing committee dimensions are separately analysed in the present study to see which 
type of fiscal structure better limits the CEO’s power in negotiating a pay for performance 
contract. 
 
Special governance committees 
Beyond the remuneration committee and the auditing committee, Portuguese listed 
firms can implement in their governance structures other special committees. Examples 
of these special committees are the corporate governance assessment committee, a 
nominating committee, among others. The existence of these committees is also 
recommended by the Portuguese governance code. These specials committees, normally 
composed with independent directors, are allegedly created with the aim of evaluating 
and enhancing corporate governance practices within the firm. As such, in firms with 
such committees, one should expect to see less agency problems (Brown and Caylor, 
2009), and therefore less CEO excess earnings. 
  
 
 
Independent directors 
In pay-performance contracts, the CEO’s earnings are determined by the board 
independence (Conyon et al., 1995; Conyon and Murphy, 2000). In light of the 
Portuguese corporate governance code and following Fama and Jensen (1983), 
independent directors should monitor the executive directors to ensure that they are 
working on behalf of the shareholders’ best interests. Given the independent directors’ 
role in the determination of pay-performance contracts, a higher number of independent 
directors make it less likely that the CEO will have an opportunity to successfully 
negotiate for an overpaid contract. Within this line of reasoning, it should be expected a 
negative relationship between the CEO’s pay and the fraction of independent directors. 
However, as Jensen (1993) stresses, outside directors are likely to be aligned with 
management, not only because top management has a non-negligible influence on the 
selection of the board members but also because, normally, these directors hold the same 
duties at many other firms. Thus, the board members that are appointed (or whose 
selection is influenced) by the current CEO are more loyal and less vigilant, and therefore 
they are expected to be more generous when making decisions about the CEO’s earnings. 
Although many empirical studies have analysed the effectiveness of board 
independence no consistent results have been yet achieved. For instance, Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009) provide evidence that independent boards are more likely to reduce 
CEO earnings suggesting that board independence is a major determinant of its efficiency. 
However, Guthrie et al. (2012), fail to confirm such results. Abdullah (2004) study on the 
effects of board independence do not provide any relation between board independence 
and firm performance, suggesting that board independence is not an effective agency 
costs controlling device.  
 
Gender diversity 
Corporate governance codes around the world have recognised that having women on 
the board is beneficial in promoting ethical behaviour, including governance.  For 
example, the Norwegian government requires that all of the boards of directors of publicly 
held ﬁrms be composed of at least 40% women and the Spanish government has also 
committed to enforce this guideline by 2015 (Hoel, 2008; De Anca, 2008). Around the 
world, other countries are considering legislation that recognises the importance of 
developing female talent at the board level (Singh, 2008). The theoretical research 
regarding having women on a board of directors (see Terjesen et al., 2009, for a review) 
argues that a board of directors with greater gender balance improves corporate 
governance through better use of the capital of the entire talent pool. These authors also 
suggest that the more diverse boards are more likely to hold the CEOs accountable for 
poor stock price performance. Given this line of thinking, if there are more females on a 
board of directors it should be less likely that the CEO will get an overvalued payment 
contract. As such, it would be expected to observe a negative relationship between the 
number of females on the board and the CEO’s earnings. 
 
Foreign directors 
Another board of directors feature that might influence CEO earnings is the level of 
foreign directors in the board. Transnational listed corporations are the main drivers of 
globalisation and there is evidence that the compositions of their boards is also becoming 
more international (Staples, 2007). Despite this evidence, scant research has been 
conducted into the role played by foreign managers on national boards. An exception is 
found in Lee et al. (2012) who show that the presence of foreign directors increases audit 
quality. This evidence might suggest that these directors enhance the firm transparency 
environment and as such the board effectiveness. Within this line of reasoning, boards 
with a larger fraction of foreign directors can limit the ability of the CEO to extract 
excessive earnings through a more effective monitoring role of the board. However, on 
the other hand, they may also support a more international remuneration policy to the 
CEO. Staples (2007) concludes that the trend toward more multinational boards provide 
a transnational social infrastructure, which may facilitate the emergence of a global 
business class. If this is the case and Portuguese managers are paid under the average 
levels of international CEO earnings the presence of managers from abroad can contribute 
to a higher CEO pay package.  
Given the above discussion the fourth hypothesis is defined as follows: 
H4: CEO earnings are a function of board of directors’ characteristics. 
 
v. Shareholders and ownership characteristics 
Shareholders activism 
The last set of factors analysed within this study is the shareholders characteristics of 
the Portuguese listed firms. The most simple and elderly corporate governance device is 
the shareholders general meetings where they can assess managers’ work. It is at the 
general meetings that shareholders decide on fundamental matters of the firm, such as the 
election of the board of directors and assessment of the executive management alignment 
with the shareholders’ interests (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996). In that sense 
shareholders activism measured as the level of shareholders meeting participation can 
reduce agency costs and therefore CEO pay (Conyon and Sadler 2010). 
 
Ownership dispersion 
In pay-performance contracts, the CEO’s earnings are also determined by the level of 
ownership dispersion (Cho, 1998). Manne (1965), in one of the first papers about the 
market for corporate control, claimed that “…only the take-over scheme provides some 
assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby affords strong 
protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders”. In the 
same line of thought, Bebchuk, et al. (2002) say that “…a company whose share price 
sags should become more vulnerable to a hostile takeover, which would likely cause the 
executives to lose their positions, pay, and perquisites”. In fact, the risk of losing their 
positions makes the market for managers more efficient and makes it less likely that CEOs 
will extract extra rents from their firms. To test this hypothesis, this paper uses the level 
of free-float as a proxy for the market for control and also the global holdings of the three 
greatest shareholders as an inverse proxy of capital dispersion. Listed firms that have a 
more dispersed ownership are more likely to be in the market for control, and therefore it 
is less likely that the CEO has enough power to increase his/her wage (Core et al., 1999; 
Gosh and Sirmans, 2005). We then expect to see a negative relationship between CEO’s 
earnings and the level capital dispersion. 
 
Shareholders agreement 
Whether or not some shareholders secure an agreement where, for example, large 
block holders agree to vote jointly and if they wish to sell their positions they give the 
other party the preference in that transaction might also influence the firm agency costs. 
Following the same rational presented above, this sort of arrangements might influence 
(negatively) the market for corporate control in the way that a hostile takeover is less 
likely to be successful when a large percentage of the firm voting rights is concentrated 
under the agreement (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). We therefore expect to see lower 
levels of CEO’s earnings in firms where such shareholders agreements do not exist.  
 
Voting cap 
Voting cap restrictions included in firms’ by-laws can make the market for corporate 
control potentially less efficient and hostile takeovers more difficult for potential bidders 
(Bebchuk et al., 2002). In fact, voting cap restrictions result in a supermajority vote by 
shareholders to approve any hostile takeover bid for control (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
The Portuguese corporate governance code has encouraged firms to withdraw this type 
of restriction, but firms claim that if it is true that voting caps makes hostile takeovers 
more difficult, it is equally true that minority shareholders believe that voting caps 
increase their voting power. Balancing both arguments, the effect of voting caps on pay-
performance contracts is not straightforward. On the one hand, this feature can be seen as 
a defence measure against hostile takeovers and therefore positively related to CEO 
earnings. On the other hand, voting caps facilitate the participation of minority 
shareholders, thus diminishing the power of the major shareholders that normally select 
the management team. As such, whether voting caps reduce or increase CEOs earnings is 
an empirical question. 
Given the above discussion the fifth hypothesis is defined as follows: 
H5: CEO earnings are a function of shareholders and ownership characteristics. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
i. Data 
This research study conducted on Portuguese listed companies is based on a set of 
hand-collected corporate governance data that was gathered from the companies’ yearly 
financial reports, corporate governance reports and websites for the years 2002-2011. All 
listed companies on the Portuguese stock exchange that have publicly available yearly 
financial and corporate governance reports as of the end of 2011 were selected. The data 
collection resulted in a sample of unbalanced panel data covering 10 years across 50 
companies and 450 year/firm observations. 
Table 1 summarises the characteristics of the data that used in this paper to test the 
proposed hypotheses. From the remuneration section of the annual corporate governance 
reports for each company, the CEOs’ compensation data was collected as of the end of 
the fiscal year during which compensation amounts were earned. The disclosure of this 
information became mandatory for all listed companies in 2009 and was non-compulsory 
in the previous years. Therefore, from 2002 to 2008, the original database lacks data for 
some firms on a direct measure of the CEO’s earnings. However, for the entire period of 
the sample, companies were obliged to disclose aggregated information on the executive 
board members’ compensation. Thus, for each company/year where the database had 
missing data, the aggregated executives’ earnings for that year was matched with the 
disaggregated CEO’s data for the following year and then scaled the data for the total 
number of executive members. By these means, the missing CEOs’ earnings data was 
estimated. To account for skewness, the natural logarithm of the CEO’s total cash 
earnings is used. The fundamental and the market data were extracted from Bloomberg. 
In appendix A, table A.1 the list of the Portuguese  
  
Table 1 - Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition and Source 
Dependent variable  
1. CEO earnings CEO’s total earnings (€). This figure includes fixed and variable 
cash earnings as well as any bonuses provided by the company, 
such as multi-period bonuses, stock based compensation and 
pension fund contributions. (Company corporate governance 
reports). 
Performance  
2. TRS Total Return to Shareholders. This return is calculated by the end 
of year return, including any dividends paid during the year. 
(Bloomberg). 
Firm characteristics  
3. Assets The book value of total assets. (Bloomberg). 
4. Employees The total number of employees as reported by the firm in the 
yearly financial report. (Bloomberg). 
5. Debt to assets ratio The ratio of total debt to total assets (%). (Bloomberg). 
6. Dividend yield The annual dividends per share paid-out by firms divided by the 
end of the year stock. (Bloomberg). 
7. Family dummy A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the controlling 
shareholder is a family member or an unlisted company, and 0 
otherwise. (Company corporate governance reports). 
8. Regulated dummy A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is a 
regulated firm (either a bank or a utility firm), and 0 otherwise. 
CEO characteristics  
9. CEO age The age in years of the CEO as of the end of the fiscal year. 
(Company corporate governance reports). 
10. CEO Tenure The total number of years that the CEO is in that position in firm 
as of the end of the year. (Company corporate governance 
reports). 
11. CEO education An ordinary variable which takes the value of 1 if the CEO does 
not have any university degree; the value of 2 if holds a bachelor's 
degree; the value of 3 if holds a bachelor's degree and one or 
more post-graduation courses; the value of 4 if holds a master's 
degree; and 5 if it holds doctoral degree. (Company corporate 
governance reports and web information). 
12. Variable earnings (%) The percentage of all non-fixed CEO earnings compared with the 
total CEO earnings. (Company corporate governance reports). 
13.Stock earnings A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the CEO earns 
any stock-based compensation, stocks and/or options. (Company 
corporate governance reports). 
Board of directors characteristics  
14. CEO/Chair Duality A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company's 
Chief Executive Officer is also Chairman of the Board and 0 
otherwise. (Company corporate governance reports). 
15. Board size The total number of directors on the firm’s board. If the company 
has supervisory and management boards, this is the total members 
of both boards. (Company corporate governance reports). 
 
Table 1 (Continued). 
Variable Definition and Source 
16. Board meetings Total annual board meetings. (Company corporate governance 
reports). 
17. Remuneration committee Total number of members of the remuneration committee board. 
(Company corporate governance reports). 
18. Fiscal board Total number of members of the fiscal board. (Company 
corporate governance reports). 
19. Auditing committee Total number of members of the auditing committee. (Company 
corporate governance reports). 
20. Other governance commissions Total number of members of other corporate governance related 
commissions. (Company corporate governance reports). 
21. % independent % of independent members on the board as reported by the firm.  
An independent member is a non-executive director with no 
economic or familiar relationship with a dominant shareholder. 
(Company corporate governance reports). 
22. % women % of female members on the board. (Company corporate 
governance reports). 
23. % foreign % of foreign members on the board. (Company corporate 
governance reports). 
Shareholders and ownership 
characteristics 
 
24. Shareholders general meeting Percentage of the capital represented in the annual general 
shareholders meetings. (company corporate governance reports). 
25. Free float Percentage of the company’s shares that are freely traded and is 
calculate as the total number of shares not held by shareholders 
with more than 5% of the capital divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding. (Company corporate governance reports). 
26. Top 3 The sum of the stakes of firm’s three largest investors. (Company 
corporate governance reports). 
27. Shareholders agreement A dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm is aware 
of any major shareholders agreement and 0 otherwise. (Company 
corporate governance reports). 
28. Voting cap The inverse of the voting cap percentage (maximum percentage 
of capital allowed to vote in the shareholders meetings). 
(company corporate governance reports). 
 
listed firms analysed in the present study is presented, as well as the time period 
considered and the number of year observations for each firm. 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our analysis. The 
average annual CEO pay yields 722.54 thousand euros. For the period considered the 
average total return to shareholders was -0.4%. This negative figure is justified by the 
subprime crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis that have lead listed firms stock 
prices to drop significantly after the year 2007. With respect to corporate governance 
variables it is worth noting that on average 57.6% of the firms has a Chairman of the 
board which is also the CEO and on average only 26.8% of the directors are considered 
independent. Finally, the majority of the firms are closely held by few shareholders, since 
the average percentage of the top three shareholders is 62.5%. 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. 
Variables 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
1. CEO earnings 450 722.54 858.55 77.00 6,225.32 
2. TRS 450 -0.004 0.491 -0.913 3.267 
3. Assets 450 27,153.44 134,524.10 23.70 1,251,526.00 
4. Employees 450 9,418.94 22,689.78 87.00 193,349.00 
5. Debt to assets ratio 450 42.321 16.960 0.000 109.145 
6. Dividend yield 450 0.027 0.085 0.000 1.468 
7. Family dummy 450 0.491 0.500 0.000 1.000 
8. Regulated dummy 450 0.142 0.350 0.000 1.000 
9. CEO age 450 54.458 10.634 31.000 83.000 
10. CEO Tenure 450 7.376 6.650 1.000 29.000 
11. CEO education 450 2.613 1.085 1.000 5.000 
12. Variable earnings (%) 450 0.266 0.245 0.000 1.000 
13. Stock earnings 450 0.187 0.390 0.000 1.000 
14. CEO/Chair Duality 450 0.576 0.495 0.000 1.000 
15. Board size 450 10.156 6.220 3.000 31.000 
16. Board meetings 450 12.824 8.973 3.000 67.000 
17. Remuneration committee 450 2.753 1.025 0.000 6.000 
18.  Fiscal board 450 2.198 1.740 0.000 18.000 
19. Auditing committee 450 1.229 1.696 0.000 6.000 
20. Other governance commissions 450 1.538 4.289 0.000 31.000 
21. % independent 450 0.268 0.231 0.000 1.000 
22. % women 450 0.055 0.092 0.000 0.400 
23. % foreign 450 0.107 0.152 0.000 0.714 
24. Shareholders general meeting 450 0.700 0.156 0.078 0.974 
25. Free float 450 0.340 0.199 0.000 1.000 
26. Top 3 450 0.625 0.224 0.031 0.997 
27. Shareholders agreement 450 0.144 0.352 0.000 1.000 
28. Voting cap 450 2.695 4.181 1.000 20.000 
Notes: Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. 
ii. Methodology 
In order to test the proposed hypotheses we rely on multivariate regression techniques. 
Since we have longitudinal data (10 years over 50 firms) the regressions estimated will 
be based on panel data models. The baseline regression model used in this study is a 
pooled OLS panel data model with the following form: 
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where CEO earnings is the dependent variable measuring total CEO pay at firm i during 
year t. performance is a covariate measured as the total return to shareholders, firm 
characteristicj is a set of firm specific variables, CEO characteristick is a set of CEO 
related variables, board characteristicl is a set of board of directors features and 
shareholders characteristicm is a set of shareholders and ownership variables. The s are 
the parameters to be estimated and uit is the error term. The relationship between the 
relevant variables is evaluated based on the t-statistics which are calculated with Huber–
White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
Within the pooled OLS estimation technique the observable covariates are assumed 
to capture all the relevant heterogeneity within the individual firms. In other words, 
pooled OLS assume that no individual-specific unobserved effect (fixed-effect) is 
present, and therefore the error term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates and 
also over time [i.e Cov(uit;Xit)=0, where Xit represent the covariates; and also that 
Cov(uit;ui,t-1)=0]. Although the present study employees a large set of firm specific 
variables some firm unobserved heterogeneity may still be present. As such for robustness 
reasons, after estimating the pooled OLS models, and for those variables that reveal to be 
(2.1) 
statistically significant we employ a (1) random effects model (RE); (2) a fixed effects 
model (FE); and a (3) linear dynamic panel data model (AB) as proposed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991). The random effects model, though also assumes that the unobserved 
heterogeneity is not correlated with the covariates, it does not require that the error term 
to be uncorrelated over time [i.e Cov(uit;ui,t-1)≠0]. In the fixed effects model, each variable 
is subtracted by its individual average (i.e. within each firm), eliminating the 
unobservable time-invariant fixed effects. Finally, the Arellano and Bond (1991) linear 
dynamic panel data estimation procedure allows the first lag of the dependent variable 
(CEO earningst-1) as a covariate and also the unobserved fixed effects (as in the fixed-
effects model). For a thorough description of these panel data models see Wooldridge 
(2002). 
 
b. Results discussion 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimated panel data OLS models. Five 
specifications are estimated, one for each set of factors presented in the hypotheses 
section. By these means one can assess the amount of variability explained by each set of 
factors. The first specification presents the results for the relationship between firm 
performance and CEO total pay. The coefficient of the current total return to shareholders 
(TRS) and the previous year TRS are both positive and statistically significant, supporting 
this paper first hypothesis (H1): the CEO’s earnings are positively associated with the 
firm’s performance measured as the TRS. Although it is found supporting evidence that 
TRS is associated with CEO earnings, the total amount of variability explained by this 
first specification, as measured by the R-squared yields 3.2%, which means that firm 
performance explains a little fraction of the total Portuguese CEO earnings.  
 
Table 3 - OLS regressions of CEO earnings  
Independent variables 
Return 
(1) 
Firm 
(2) 
CEO 
(3) 
Board 
(4) 
Ownership 
(5) 
      
TRS 0.220*** 0.148*** 0.045 0.060 0.075* 
 (2.624) (3.169) (0.994) (1.358) (1.681) 
TRSt-1 0.250*** 0.158*** 0.076* 0.088** 0.099** 
 (2.947) (3.761) (1.759) (2.126) (2.384) 
Log(assets)  0.372*** 0.279*** 0.272*** 0.274*** 
  (12.831) (9.687) (8.824) (9.011) 
Log(employees)  -0.069* -0.029 -0.032 -0.039 
  (-1.905) (-0.869) (-0.941) (-1.162) 
Debt to assets ratio  -0.003* -0.002 -0.000 0.001 
  (-1.881) (-1.252) (-0.183) (0.518) 
Dividend yield  0.511*** 0.235** 0.269** 0.262** 
  (3.050) (2.142) (2.581) (2.469) 
Family dummy  -0.069 -0.199*** -0.231*** -0.162** 
  (-1.200) (-3.884) (-3.601) (-2.439) 
Regulated dummy  -0.616*** -0.575*** -0.532*** -0.585*** 
  (-5.917) (-6.576) (-5.661) (-6.040) 
CEO age   0.004 0.005* 0.005* 
   (1.513) (1.700) (1.855) 
CEO Tenure   0.003 0.004 0.007 
   (0.538) (0.790) (1.327) 
CEO education   -0.067** -0.066** -0.080*** 
   (-2.418) (-2.383) (-2.952) 
Variable earnings (%)   1.200*** 1.064*** 1.013*** 
   (8.391) (7.693) (7.475) 
Stock earnings   -0.125* -0.100 -0.116* 
   (-1.896) (-1.590) (-1.858) 
CEO/Chair Duality    -0.122* -0.154** 
    (-1.814) (-2.366) 
Log(board size)    -0.143 -0.166* 
    (-1.641) (-1.839) 
Board meetings    -0.006 -0.004 
    (-1.439) (-1.079) 
Remuneration committee    0.063** 0.076** 
    (2.053) (2.545) 
Fiscal board    -0.018 -0.009 
    (-1.017) (-0.538) 
Auditing committee    0.019 0.034 
    (0.876) (1.532) 
Other governance commissions    0.026*** 0.028*** 
    (4.236) (4.185) 
% independent    -0.356*** -0.302** 
    (-2.833) (-2.457) 
% women    0.118 -0.010 
    (0.382) (-0.033) 
% foreign    0.279 0.338* 
    (1.476) (1.698) 
Shareholders general meeting     -0.733*** 
     (-2.724) 
Free float     -0.641** 
     (-2.014) 
Top 3     -0.234 
     (-0.860) 
 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Independent variables 
Return 
(1) 
Firm 
(2) 
CEO 
(3) 
Board 
(4) 
Ownership 
(5) 
Shareholders agreement     0.188*** 
     (2.989) 
Voting cap     0.012* 
     (1.751) 
Constant 6.184*** 4.314*** 4.308*** 4.605*** 5.364*** 
 (143.137) (26.553) (19.085) (18.435) (12.652) 
      
Observations 400 400 400 400 400 
R-squared 0.032 0.623 0.706 0.739 0.752 
Adj. R2 0.027 0.616 0.696 0.723 0.733 
F statistic 6.841 96.666 88.049 60.053 61.843 
(p-value) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Notes: The dependent variable is log(CEO earnings). Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. 
Heteroskedastic robust t statistics in parentheses below the parameters. *, ** and *** refer to significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
In specification (2) we added the firm specific factors to the model as proposed in 
hypothesis 2. As can be seen, the R-squared increases to 62.3% which reveals that these 
factors explain a large fraction of the total CEO earnings. Particularly it is found that firm 
dimension, as measured by the book value of assets, and dividend yield are positively 
associated with higher levels of CEO pay. Consistent with previous empirical studies (e.g. 
Fernandes, 2008) the present results corroborate that firm size drives chief executives’ 
earnings up.  The results do not provide evidence that dividends can help reduce CEO’s 
earnings. Actually, the results reveal that, after controlling for the TRS, firms with higher 
levels of dividend yields pay more to their CEO’s and that relationship is economically 
and statistically significant (t=3.05). This result is consistent with the view of La Porta et 
al. (2000) where firms that need to come to the external market for funds, must establish 
ex ant a good reputation. One way to establish such a reputation is by paying out more 
dividends. Shareholders are willing to pay more to managers who have better reputation, 
i.e. pay-out more dividends. This result is also consistent with the theory that firms link 
executives’ compensation to dividend payments to reduce conflicts between shareholders 
and management (White, 1996). As predicted in the firm specific hypothesis, the 
variables: number of employees; debt to assets ratio; family dummy; and regulated 
dummy; are negatively associated with the CEO total pay. Particularly relevant is the 
association between the variable regulated dummy and CEO earnings where the 
coefficient is the highest among the variables used in this specification and the t statistic 
yields -5.917. This result suggests that ceteris paribus Portuguese regulated listed firms 
pay less to their CEOs. 
In specification (3) we include in the model the CEO specific characteristics. After 
doing so the R-square increases to 0.706 (which represents an absolute increase of 8.3%). 
Although not statistically different from zero, the coefficients of the variables CEO age 
and tenure are both positive. This positive association is consistent the entrenchment 
hypothesis where older and more experienced CEO are more difficult to replace and 
therefore more able to negotiate an above average pay package. An interesting result is 
the negative the coefficient of the education variable. Contrary to what we expected, the 
results reveal that the higher the CEO education level the less is his total pay. An 
interpretation of this result may be that CEOs who have more education degrees are also 
the ones who are more sensitive to the labour market for CEOs. In other words, the less 
educated CEOs might possess more business specific knowledge and therefore will be 
more entrenched and overpaid. Overall, the human capital variables are in line with the 
entrenchment hypothesis and with previous empirical studies, in the way that human 
capital variables generally have weak effects on CEO wages (Wade et al. 2006). 
An interesting result within the CEO specific characteristics is the positive association 
between the fraction of variable earnings paid to the chief executives (variable earnings 
%) and the total CEO earnings. Further, this relationship is found to be economically and 
statistically relevant (t=8.391). Therefore, having a large fraction of non-fixed earnings 
does not necessarily mean that the total CEO earnings will be more aligned with the firm 
performance. In fact, the results reveal that CEOs who receive more non-fixed earnings 
are also receiving more excess earnings (i.e. above what would be expected after 
controlling for the total return for shareholders). There is also some evidence that stock-
based compensation limits the opportunity for the CEOs to extract cash payments. 
Overall, these results reveal that having a large fraction of non-fixed CEO compensation 
does not necessarily means more alignment with firm performance. Actually, the results 
support the design of a remuneration package structured to have more equity based 
compensation rather than cash based bonuses. 
In specification (4) the model adds the board of directors’ specific characteristics. The 
R-square in this specification yields 0.739 (which represents an absolute increase of 
3.3%). This increase in the R-square is much lower than the increase observed when the 
CEO specific factors are added into the model. This difference indicates that the board 
characteristics are less economically important to explain CEO total compensation when 
compared with firm performance, firm characteristics and CEO characteristics. With 
respect to the variables it is found that when the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
the total CEO earnings are lower. This negative relationship is statistically significant at 
a 10% level (t = 1.814) and contrary to what was expected and to the recent empirical 
findings (Shin and Seo, 2011). This result might be related to the sample used in this 
study. As already mentioned, the Portuguese listed firms are characterized by being small 
firms with simple governance structures (in 57.6% of the firms the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board).  This result might therefore mean that the relationship is rather 
connected with the fact that these firms have simple governance structures and, as such, 
pay less to their CEOs. Nevertheless, no favourable evidence is provided as that having a 
non-executive chairman mitigates the CEO ability to extract extra earnings. Although not 
statistically significant, the results of the board size variable reveal a negative relationship 
between the size of the board and the total CEO earnings, consistent with the view that a 
larger board is less efficient. Similar results are found with respect to the board activity 
as measured by the total number of annual board meetings. 
With respect to the board committees (remuneration committee, fiscal board, auditing 
committee and other governance commissions) the results are quite surprising. The 
existence and dimension of the remuneration committee is positively related with the 
CEO earnings and this relationship is statistically significant (t = 2.053). This result 
reveals that firms with no remuneration committee pay less to their CEOs, suggesting that 
this type of governance device (in Portugal) does not lead to a reduction in the CEOs 
ability to extract extra rents from the firm. This result is also consistent with de 
chairman/CEO duality variable which provide evidence that simple governance structures 
have less agency costs when measured by the ability of CEOs to earn excess wages. The 
result for the other governance committees variable provide similar results and the 
relationship is also positive and statistically significant, providing further evidence of the 
uncertainty of the efficiency of these corporate governance devices. With respect to the 
auditing committee and the fiscal board no statistical significant relationship with CEO 
earnings is found. 
Regarding the effect of the fraction of independent members on the board (% 
independent) a negative and statistically significant (at the 1% level) relationship between 
this variable and the dependent variable is found, which provides support for the 
hypothesis that independent directors are more likely to provide proper monitoring. No 
statistically significant relationship is found between the board gender diversity and also 
the level of foreign directors in the board. 
Turning now to the shareholders characteristics, in specification 5 of table 3, the R-
square is 0.752 which reveals that these characteristics explain a further 1.3% of the CEO 
total earnings. The first characteristic analysed is the shareholders activism measured by 
the percentage of voting rights present in the ordinary general shareholders meetings 
(shareholders general meeting). The results strongly support the hypothesis that this high-
level decision-making body is an important determinant of CEO earnings. The coefficient 
of the shareholders general meeting variable is negative (-0.733) and statistically different 
from zero (t = -2.724) which leads to the interpretation that these meetings are an 
important agency costs control mechanism and may promote a reduction of CEO excess 
earnings. The free float variable results reveal a negative sign for the parameter. A 
statistically significant t statistic (-2.014) for this variable is recognized. It was 
hypothesised that the CEO’s earnings are a negative function of the free float. Thus, the 
results provide supporting evidence that the market for corporate control is an effective 
governance device in the sense that it potentially reduces CEOs excess earnings. With 
respect to the top 3 variable, which aims to capture ownership concentration, it is not 
found a statistically relevant relationship with CEO earnings. Finally, with respect to the 
variables shareholders agreement and voting cap the results reveal a positive relationship 
between these variables and CEO earnings. These results are consistent with the market 
for corporate control hypothesis which predicts that any anti-takeover device increases 
the difficulty of an acquisition and therefore increases the CEO entrenchment. The results 
are particularly significant with respect to the shareholders agreement variable where the 
t statistic is 2.989, signifying that when large shareholders enter into an agreement the 
market for control might be less efficient and CEOs more able to extract extra rents. The 
coefficient of the voting cap variable is also positive and statistically significant (at a 10% 
level), signifying that companies with more voting rights restrictions have a higher level 
of payments to their CEOs. Hence, these results suggest that withdrawing these anti-
takeover devices may limit CEOs earnings. 
In sum, with respect to the proposed hypotheses, the statistically significant results 
from the full model (specification 5 of table 3) reveal that CEO earnings are a positive 
function of firm performance as measured by the current and previous year’ total return 
to shareholders, as proposed in H1. In relation to firm specific factors (H2), the results 
reveal that CEO earnings are a positive function of the firm dimension and the firm 
dividend yield and are lower in family and regulated firms. CEO specific characteristics 
that drive CEO earnings up (H3) are CEO age and the fraction of the CEO earnings that 
are variable. The results also show that more educated CEOs have lower earnings. 
Further, CEO pay packages that include stock based compensation might reduce CEO 
total earnings. The board of directors’ characteristics (H4) that are positively and 
statistically related with the CEO earnings are the size of the remuneration committee and 
other governance commissions and the level of foreign directors within the board. The 
variables that restrict CEO earnings are the CEO/Chair Duality dummy variable, the 
board size and the percentage of independent directors within the board. Finally, the 
shareholders characteristics (H5) that have a positive influence on the level of CEO total 
earnings are the shareholders agreements and the voting cap. The level of participation in 
the shareholders general meeting and the free float are negatively associated with the 
CEO earnings. 
Based on the statistically significant results achieved in table 3, we further analyse the 
robustness of these associations in table 4. In the first specification (column 1) we provide 
results from the full set of variables that were statistically significant in specification 5 of 
table 3. All variables remain statistically significant, except for the
 
 
 
 
Table 4 - Robustness checks. 
Independent variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS RE FE AB 
      
Log(CEO earnings)t-1 - - - - -0.050* 
     (-1.731) 
TRS 0.062 - - - - 
 (1.391)     
TRSt-1 0.089** 0.085** 0.045* 0.041* 0.042*** 
 (2.121) (2.137) (1.721) (1.723) (7.432) 
Log(assets) 0.259*** 0.238*** 0.185*** 0.012 0.032 
 (13.214) (15.264) (6.537) (0.132) (1.368) 
Dividend yield 0.258** 0.246** 0.020 0.024 0.389*** 
 (2.350) (2.274) (0.269) (0.196) (5.851) 
Family dummy -0.192*** -0.159*** -0.202* - - 
 (-3.628) (-3.007) (-1.813)   
Regulated dummy -0.579*** -0.593*** -0.379*** - - 
 (-8.280) (-8.238) (-2.586)   
CEO age 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007* 0.010** 0.004*** 
 (2.951) (3.024) (1.906) (2.482) (3.328) 
CEO education -0.085*** -0.086*** -0.056* -0.029 -0.020 
 (-3.334) (-3.418) (-1.797) (-0.852) (-1.636) 
Variable earnings (%) 1.079*** 1.064*** 1.206*** 1.212*** 1.335*** 
 (8.344) (8.761) (7.146) (7.185) (34.563) 
Stock earnings -0.056 - - - - 
 (-0.974)     
CEO/Chair Duality -0.124** -0.094* -0.191*** -0.273*** -0.162*** 
 (-1.973) (-1.660) (-3.012) (-3.972) (-4.580) 
Log(board size) -0.127 - - - - 
 (-1.516)     
Remuneration committee 0.076*** 0.068** 0.057* 0.042 0.057*** 
 (2.651) (2.344) (1.690) (1.150) (4.870) 
Other governance commissions 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.013** 0.012* 0.001 
 (3.512) (3.693) (2.468) (1.787) (0.607) 
% independent -0.308** -0.299** -0.354** -0.411** -0.008 
 (-2.543) (-2.485) (-2.099) (-2.210) (-0.283) 
% foreign 0.380** 0.321* 0.433 0.460 0.473*** 
 (2.145) (1.767) (0.927) (0.532) (3.324) 
Shareholders general meeting -0.748*** -0.762*** -0.417 -0.403 -0.164** 
 (-2.701) (-2.810) (-1.239) (-1.108) (-2.306) 
Free float -0.472** -0.495** 0.185 0.225 -0.030 
 (-2.062) (-2.211) (0.751) (0.832) (-0.232) 
Shareholders agreement 0.160** 0.149** 0.264*** 0.320*** 0.231*** 
 (2.559) (2.395) (3.139) (2.856) (10.566) 
Voting cap 0.014** 0.013** -0.007 -0.017 -0.008*** 
 (2.095) (2.002) (-0.718) (-1.339) (-4.208) 
Constant 4.775*** 4.648*** 4.633*** 5.599*** 5.755*** 
 (16.904) (16.944) (11.687) (7.077) (34.993) 
      
Observations (firms) 400 (50) 400 (50) 400 (50) 400 (50) 350 (50) 
Adj. R2 0.728 0.727 0.716 0.524 - 
F statistic 70.797 82.021 - - - 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000)    
Wald 2   633.190 14.162 47522.449 
(p-value)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
 Table 2.4. (Continued). 
Independent variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
OLS OLS RE FE AB 
AR(1) test     -1.8983 
(p-value)     (0.0577) 
AR(2) test     -0.15877 
(p-value)     (0.8739) 
Sargan 2      38.09287 
(p-value)     (0.3305) 
Notes: The dependent variable is log(CEO earnings). Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. 
Column (1) and (2) provide parameters estimates using OLS models, column (3) provides a random effects 
(RE) model, column (5) a fixed effects model and column (6) the Arellano-Bond (1991) linear dynamic 
panel-data model. Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions (H0: overidentifying restrictions are valid). 
AR(1) and AR(2) Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation in first-differenced errors. 
(t or z -statistics) in parentheses are below the parameters. *, ** and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels respectively. 
 
current year total return to shareholders (TRS) and the dummy variable stock earnings. 
Based on this evidence we run a new OLS regression dropping these two variables 
(specification 2). These results remain statistically significant for all the variables. In 
specification 3 we run a random effects (RE) regression, which controls for 
autocorrelation within firms. The results remain qualitatively identic, even though some 
variables lose their statistical significance. In the fourth specification a fixed effects model 
is employed to control for possible endogeneity in the model. Since this model requires 
variability in the independent variables, all the time invariant dummy variables such as 
the regulated and family dummy variables are dropped from the model. The results 
obtained remain qualitatively similar. Nevertheless, the statistically significance of the 
coefficients decreases in several variables. This should be expected, since the fixed effects 
model subtracts the variables average which in turn significantly reduces the cross section 
variability of the covariates. Finally, the Arellano and Bond (AB) linear dynamic panel 
data estimation procedure is assessed. Within this model the first lag of the dependent 
variable is considered as an independent variable. The coefficients reveal similar figures 
to those found on the previous specifications. Moreover, the AB model reveals that CEO 
earnings present a negative and statistically significant autocorrelation (at 10% level of 
significance). The Sargan 2 test cannot be rejected at any conventional level of 
significance, meaning that we cannot reject that the AB instruments are valid. 
c. Conclusion  
This paper empirically analyses the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and Chief Executive Officers’ (CEO) wages among listed companies in Portugal 
using panel data from 2002-2011. The relationship between CEO total compensation and 
shareholders return, firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, board of directors and 
shareholders characteristics is analysed. Several OLS specifications are adopted, one for 
each set of factors. For robustness purposes a random effects model, a fixed effects model 
and the Arellano and Bond (1991) model are also adopted. 
With respect to the determinants of the Portuguese CEO earnings the results reported 
in the present study are generally consistent with other countries’ findings. Particularly, 
that firm specific factors accounts for the majority of the variance in total CEO pay, while 
firm performance accounts for less than 5% (Tosi et al., 2000). Moreover, it is found that 
CEO earnings are higher in larger firms and in firms that have higher levels of dividend 
yields. Further, the CEO earnings are lower in family and regulated firms. It is also found 
that CEO age and the fraction of the CEO earnings that are variable drive the executives’ 
earnings up. The results also show that more educated CEOs have lower earnings. There 
is also some evidence that CEO pay packages that include stock based compensation 
might reduce CEO total earnings. With respect to the board of directors’ characteristics it 
is found that the size of the remuneration committee and other governance commissions 
and the level of foreign directors within the board are positively associated with the CEOs 
earnings. On the other hand when the CEO is the same person as the chairman of the 
board, when the board is large and the percentage of independent directors within the 
board is also large the CEO receives lower total earnings. With respect to the shareholders 
characteristics the results found support a positive influence of the shareholders 
agreements and the voting caps on the level of CEO pay. Finally, the level of participation 
in the shareholders general meeting and the free float are found to be negatively 
associated with the CEO earnings. 
The overall conclusion is that the CEO’s earnings are driven by firm performance, 
CEO and board characteristics and also shareholders characteristics, providing new 
insights to the determinants of executives’ earnings and validating some of the previous 
research in this field (e.g. Ozkan 2011). Therefore the overall conclusion is that there are 
persistent effects on governance in distinct markets as well as aspects specific to each 
market. 
It is recognised that a Portuguese CEO earns on average less than a CEO in Europe 
as a whole (Heidrick and Struggles, 2009). This income difference is expected when 
taking into account the lower GDP per capita in Portugal. However, governance 
principles are needed for Portuguese companies to restrict the ability of uncompetitive 
CEOs (AdCapita and Cranfield University, 2003) to extract rents from their companies. 
The policy implications of the present research are therefore as follows. First, the adoption 
of the governance code by all listed and non-listed companies should be promoted in an 
effort to advance the progress of Portugal in terms of governance best practices. Second, 
the effective roles of the remuneration committee and other governance commissions 
should be screened; as it is not clear that they properly monitor and limit the CEO’s 
earnings. Third, minimum requirements for percentages of independent members on 
boards should be instituted, as result of the positive effect found on restricting the CEO’s 
earnings. Fourth, the inclusion of stock-based compensation as a part of the CEO’s 
earnings should be promoted because stock-based compensation limits excessive 
earnings for CEOs. Fifth, variable cash based bonuses should be rethought as this sort of 
payment is driving upwards CEOs earnings. Sixth, CEO education should be disclosed 
as it seems that a lack of education might reveal some entrenchment and the ability for 
executives to earn excess earnings. Finally, anti-takeover devices such as shareholders 
agreements or voting caps should be discouraged and the shareholder participation on 
general meetings promoted.  
This essay presents several limitations. First, because the Portuguese stock market is 
quite small the total sample used (50 firms) limits the ability to generalize these results to 
other realities. Secondly, the relative recent adoption of the sole code of governance code 
in Portugal also limits the assessment of the corporate governance devices effectiveness. 
Finally, the necessity of having to estimate the value of total CEO earnings for some firms 
and years also results in a limitation of the present study, in sense that it translates into 
potential measurement errors in the analysis. For these reasons, more research is needed 
to confirm these results. Thus, it would be interesting for us to further investigate the 
relationship between the CEOs earnings and corporate governance in Portugal using 
different techniques and time spans. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1. List of Portuguese listed firms and sample observations. 
Ticker Firm name N Period 
ALTR Altri, SGPS, S.A. 7 2005-2011 
BCP Banco Comercial Português, S.A. 10 2002-2011 
BES Banco Espírito Santo, S.A. 10 2002-2011 
BNF Banif - SGPS, S.A. 10 2002-2011 
POP Banco Popular Español, SA 5 2007-2011 
BPI Banco BPI, S.A. 10 2002-2011 
BRI Brisa - Auto Estradas de Portugal, SA 10 2002-2011 
CFN Cofina - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
COMAE Compta - Equipamento e Serviços de Informática, SA 10 2002-2011 
COR Corticeira Amorim - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
CPR Cimpor - Cimentos de Portugal, SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
EDP EDP - Energias de Portugal, SA 10 2002-2011 
EDPR EDP Renováveis, SA 4 2008-2011 
EGL Mota-Engil, SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
ESO Estoril Sol - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
FCP Futebol Clube do Porto - Futebol, SAD 10 2002-2011 
FSP Fisipe - Fibras Sintéticas de Portugal, SA 10 2002-2011 
GALP Galp Energia, SGPS, SA 6 2006-2011 
GLINT Glintt - Global Intelligent Technologies, SGPS, S.A.  10 2002-2011 
GPA Imobiliária Construtora Grão Pará, SA 10 2002-2011 
IBS Ibersol - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
INA Inapa - Investimentos, Participações e Gestão, SA 10 2002-2011 
IPR Impresa - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
JMT Jeronimo Martins - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
LIG Lisgráfica - Impressão e Artes Gráficas, SA 10 2002-2011 
MAR Martifer - SGPS, SA 5 2007-2011 
MCP Grupo Media Capital SGPS, SA 8 2004-2011 
NBA Novabase - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
ORE Sociedade Comercial Orey Antunes, SA 10 2002-2011 
PTC Portugal Telecom, SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
PTI Portucel - Empresa Produtora de Pasta e Papel, SA 10 2002-2011 
RAM F. Ramada - Investimentos, SGPS, S.A. 4 2008-2011 
RED Reditus - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
RENE REN - Redes Energéticas Nacionais, SGPS, SA 5 2007-2011 
SVA SAG Gest - Soluções Automóvel Globais, SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
SAN Banco Santander, SA 10 2002-2011 
SCOAE Grupo Soares da Costa, SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
SCP Sporting - Sociedade Desportiva de Futebol, SAD 10 2002-2011 
SCT Toyota Caetano Portugal, SA 10 2002-2011 
SYV Sacyr Vallehermoso, SA 8 2004-2011 
SEM Semapa - Sociedade Investimento e Gestão, SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
SLBEN Sport Lisboa e Benfica - Futebol SAD 3 2009-2011 
 
Table A.1. (Continued). 
Ticker Firm name N Period 
SNC SONAECOM - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
SON Sonae - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
SONC Sonae Capital, SGPS, SA 5 2007-2011 
SONI Sonae Indústria - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
SUCO SUMOL+COMPAL, S.A. 10 2002-2011 
TDU Teixeira Duarte - Engenharia e Construções, SA 10 2002-2011 
VAF VAA - Vista Alegre Atlantis - SGPS, SA 10 2002-2011 
ZON 
ZON MULTIMÉDIA - Serviços de Telecomunicações e 
Multimédia - SGPS, S.A (former PT Multimedia) 
10 2002-2011 
Table A.2. Pearson correlation matrix of the variables used in the analysis. 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
1.Log(CEO earnings) 1            
2.TRS 0.0986* 1           
3.Log(assets) 0.742*** 0.0161 1          
4.Log(employees) 0.629*** 0.0675 0.820*** 1         
5.Debt to assets ratio -0.00595 -0.0774 0.0438 -0.0559 1        
6.Dividend yield 0.135** 0.000962 0.104* 0.0958* 0.000658 1       
7.Family dummy -0.134** 0.0544 -0.127** 0.0463 -0.0621 0.0472 1      
8.Regulated dummy 0.281*** -0.0546 0.570*** 0.245*** -0.0304 0.0334 -0.145** 1     
9.CEO age 0.176*** 0.00745 0.185*** 0.111* 0.0498 -0.0816 0.125** 0.0999* 1    
10.CEO Tenure 0.154** -0.0132 0.115* 0.0304 0.0794 0.0108 0.193*** 0.0392 0.591*** 1   
11.CEO education -0.139** 0.0429 -0.0810 0.0677 -0.125** -0.0761 -0.00634 -0.213*** -0.376*** -0.303*** 1  
12.Variable earnings (%) 0.653*** 0.174*** 0.518*** 0.461*** -0.0837 0.146** 0.0723 0.220*** -0.00356 0.108* -0.0569 1 
13.Stock earnings 0.319*** -0.0128 0.375*** 0.281*** -0.0887 0.0331 -0.220*** 0.131** -0.0502 0.0322 0.0867 0.345*** 
14.CEO/Chair Duality -0.293*** 0.00473 -0.294*** -0.287*** 0.0957* -0.0461 0.0522 -0.178*** 0.252*** 0.264*** -0.103* -0.273*** 
15.Log(board size) 0.625*** -0.000318 0.794*** 0.654*** -0.0313 0.103* -0.294*** 0.513*** 0.0210 0.0327 -0.0196 0.474*** 
16.Board meetings -0.0220 -0.0666 0.0544 0.0167 0.0637 -0.00385 -0.119* 0.142** -0.110* -0.0321 -0.0104 -0.0537 
17.Remuneration committee 0.347*** 0.0141 0.307*** 0.313*** -0.0323 0.0779 -0.193*** 0.0173 -0.120* 0.0169 0.0602 0.181*** 
18.Fiscal board -0.125** -0.0839 -0.0419 -0.0856 0.0334 -0.0125 0.00330 0.115* 0.0227 -0.0495 0.000488 -0.124** 
19.Auditing committee 0.546*** 0.00777 0.621*** 0.535*** -0.0806 0.0558 -0.196*** 0.287*** 0.0462 -0.0311 0.0434 0.399*** 
20.Other governance commissions 0.359*** -0.0480 0.335*** 0.270*** -0.0629 0.0339 -0.177*** 0.356*** -0.0373 -0.0828 -0.0854 0.256*** 
21.% independent 0.0556 -0.0383 0.178*** 0.186*** 0.0309 0.0447 -0.248*** 0.0828 -0.129** -0.234*** -0.00778 0.0717 
22.% women -0.0837 0.0288 -0.0954* -0.0495 0.0998* -0.00384 0.294*** -0.136** 0.209*** 0.168*** -0.162*** -0.107* 
23.% foreign 0.213*** 0.0129 0.162*** 0.208*** -0.222*** 0.0897 0.122** 0.0660 0.0824 0.0178 0.0815 0.186*** 
24.Shareholders general meeting -0.172*** -0.0521 -0.156*** -0.163*** 0.0252 -0.000665 0.0704 -0.0437 0.0482 0.0684 -0.142** -0.194*** 
25.Free float 0.370*** 0.0522 0.475*** 0.420*** 0.0874 0.0339 -0.259*** 0.291*** 0.0337 -0.0211 0.0867 0.291*** 
Table A.2. (Continued). 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
26.Top 3 -0.355*** -0.0306 -0.432*** -0.370*** -0.136** -0.0211 0.349*** -0.241*** -0.0115 0.0537 -0.108* -0.247*** 
27.Shareholders agreement 0.0870 -0.00168 0.0839 0.0572 -0.171*** -0.0232 -0.214*** 0.104* 0.0674 -0.0366 0.117* -0.0373 
28.Voting cap 0.210*** -0.0266 0.274*** 0.170*** 0.0494 0.0506 -0.399*** 0.429*** -0.135** -0.198*** -0.0949* 0.118* 
 
Variable (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
13.Stock earnings 1            
14.CEO/Chair Duality -0.177*** 1           
15.Log(board size) 0.393*** -0.471*** 1          
16.Board meetings -0.156*** 0.00325 0.00541 1         
17.Remuneration committee 0.199*** -0.150** 0.338*** 0.0696 1        
18.Fiscal board -0.0840 -0.0808 -0.0262 0.382*** -0.0850 1       
19.Auditing committee 0.420*** -0.293*** 0.591*** -0.228*** 0.350*** -0.379*** 1      
20.Other governance commissions 0.0224 -0.298*** 0.374*** 0.308*** 0.0460 0.187*** 0.152** 1     
21.% independent 0.237*** -0.130** 0.153** -0.163*** 0.0252 -0.0624 0.247*** 0.00193 1    
22.% women -0.141** 0.146** -0.125** -0.0264 -0.231*** 0.00422 -0.115* -0.104* -0.177*** 1   
23. % foreign 0.190*** -0.368*** 0.247*** -0.172*** 0.153** -0.0322 0.318*** 0.122** 0.0630 -0.170*** 1  
24.Shareholders general meeting -0.212*** -0.112* -0.0577 0.0565 -0.00770 -0.0211 -0.0990* -0.0110 -0.0850 0.0372 0.208*** 1 
25.Free float 0.287*** -0.0145 0.396*** 0.115* 0.146** 0.0413 0.327*** 0.254*** 0.173*** -0.131** -0.162*** -0.719*** 
26.Top 3 -0.332*** -0.0255 -0.398*** -0.0653 -0.171*** 0.00304 -0.316*** -0.237*** -0.147** 0.113* 0.195*** 0.674*** 
27.Shareholders agreement 0.0465 0.0715 0.140** 0.0370 0.0126 -0.127** 0.0228 -0.00731 -0.0746 0.0443 0.0378 0.111* 
28.Voting cap 0.0752 -0.200*** 0.390*** 0.0827 0.0422 -0.0229 0.213*** 0.272*** 0.222*** -0.161*** -0.0781 -0.125** 
 
Table A.2. (Continued). 
Variable (25) (26) (27) (28) 
25.Free float 1    
26.Top 3 -0.909*** 1   
27.Shareholders agreement 0.00451 -0.0831 1  
28.Voting cap 0.325*** -0.341*** 0.153** 1 
Notes: This table reports Pearson correlations between the variables used in the analysis. 
Significance levels are computed as two tailed p-values: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
